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COMMENTS

TAKING THE AMMUNITION AWAY FROM THE
"WAR ON DRUGS". A DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR TO
21 U.S.C. § 881 AFTER AUSTIN V UNITED STATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout .the 1980's, the Umted States government waged a
full scale war on drugs. Its ammunition was enhanced sentencing
for drug dealers and users,' mandatory drug testing2 and restricting
the flow of drugs imported into the United States.3 The H-bomb in
the war on drugs is the federal civil drug forfeiture statute, 21
U.S.C. § 881, which may be brought without securing a criminal

1. See A. Morgan Cloud, 111, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. Rnv. 725, 776-77

(1989) (commenting that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 increased penalties for drug
use, possession and trafficking); see also James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark
Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV.

1951, 1956 n.23 (1991) (commenting that the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 enhanced the sentences of certain drug offenders); Conference on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE LJ. 2053, 2061 (1992) (remarks of Mar-

garet A. Grove, Yale Law Journal ed.) (arguing that one purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-which went into effect in 1987-was to provide adequate sentences for
drug-trafficking offenders based on the seriousness of the crime).
2. See Richard Lacayo, A Threat To Freedom?; Civil Liberties Could Be A Casualty

Of Bush's War On Drugs, TImE, September 18, 1989, at 28 (claiming that as a result of
the war on drugs, 43% of all businesses with 1000 or more employees have drug-testing
programs and that President Bush was calling for even more drug-testing in a recent
speech).
3. See Louis Kraar, How To Win The War On Drugs, FORTUNE, March 12, 1990, at

70 (giving examples of the war on drugs aim of restricting imports to the United States:
invading Panama in part to prosecute Nonega for crimes as a drug trafficker stationing
U.S. Mannes as border patrols for the first time; and Bush's anti-drug summit to rally the
governments of Colombia, Bolivia. and Peru to fight the powerful cocaine cartels).
4. 21 U.S.C. §881 (1988) provides in relevant part:
a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
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conviction and which provides little procedural protection to defendants.' Section 881 allows the government to seize an individual's
property based only on the government's showing of probable
cause that there is a connection between the property and the commission of a federal drug violation.6 The individual then bears the

4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [illegal drugs and equipment
used to make or deliver them]
6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter
7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment
Controlled substances, their containers and equipment used to manufacture them are
forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(1)(3) & (9) respectively.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 881 is an action in rem-against the property itself-and is therefore
independent of criminal proceedings. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (discussing the history of in rem procedure in forfeiture claims).
Forfeiture proceedings are conducted under the Supplemental Rules for certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (unless inconsistent with the
Supplemental Rules), local rules of court and customs laws. See 1 MARY B. TROLAND.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFErruRE: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY, at 7-8 (1988).
Forfeiture may proceed summarily or administratively. Id. at 40-41. Summary forfeiture involves seizure without notice or heanng and is reserved for seizing contraband or
property with a value of less than $100,000. Id. at 40. In 1987, however, the Assistant
Attorney General declared that all real property forfeiture would proceed judicially, regardless of its value. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIRECTIVE ON JUDICIAL FORFEITURE OF REAL
PROPERTY (1987), reprinted in TROLAND, supra at app. XIV
Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, requires a conviction of the defendant for a
violation of the drug laws and a showing by the government by a preponderance of the
evidence. that: 1) the property was "acquired
during the time of the violation
or
within a reasonable time thereafter" and 2) that there is no other likely source for the
property other than the violation of the drug laws. 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988). See generally Brian H. Redmond, Annotation: Validity, Construction, And Application Of Criminal
Forfeiture Provisions Of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention And Control Act of 1970
(21 USCS § 853), 88 A.L.R. FED. 189 (1992).
6. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (the custom law which provides that the government
must first show probable cause and then the burden shifts to the claimant in forfeiture
proceedings); see also United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F Supp. 1295, 1298
(W.D. Ark. 1990) (stating that the government bears the burden of proof of establishing
probable cause that the property was used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction).
The tests for determinng probable cause are the same as the tests used to determine
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burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
property was neither used, nor intended to be used, illegally or that
it falls within one of the statutory exceptions.7 Section 881 was
broadened in the 1980's to include the forfeiture of real property'
and, under the government's zero tolerance policy, was applied to
seize large amounts of property for even the smallest violations of
the drug laws.9 The main purpose of civil forfeiture is to deter
drug dealers by confiscating their proceeds from drug sales and
thereby eliminate any incentive to sell drugs.10 Without suppliers,
the subsequent use of drugs would disappear."
The Umted States is losing the war on drugs and, in the process, making civil liberties a casualty "2Congress recently acted to

probable cause for arrests, searches, and seizures. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 12
(1987) (citing DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG
AGENTS' GUIDE TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 33-51 (1978), for a detailed discussion of rules
governing determinations of probable cause). Hearsay is admissible in a forfeiture proceeding to establish probable cause to the same extent it is adussible in other probable cause
hearings. See td. at 15-20 (discussing admissibility of hearsay as provided for by the
Federal Rules of Evidence and precedent).
7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). The statutory exceptions include exceptions for a
common carrier, a stolen conveyance, and an innocent owner. See United States v. Stephen Bros. Lines, 384 F.2d 118, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1967) (providing a definition of a common carrier as one who holds themselves out as one who transports goods or services);
see infra notes 110-11 for a discussion of the innocent owner defense.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) was enacted in 1984 and added forfeiture of all real
property used to facilitate a violation of the drug laws, including the entire lot of property when only a piece was used.
9. See Charles Rangel, Reagan's 'Zero Tolerance' Is a Zero Drug Policy, NEWSDAY,
June 28, 1988, at 66 (describing Reagan's zero tolerance policy which encouraged govemrment agents to seize individual property for violation of the drug laws by implementing § 881). One example of the grossly disproportionate seizures authorized by this
policy was the seizure of a $2.5 million yacht for less than one-tenth of an ounce of
marijuana. See Luxury Yacht is Seized with Bit of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1988,
at A16.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4574 (describing the general philosophy of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, of which civil forfeiture is a part, as making the price
for participation in drug trafficking prohibitive and too dangerous to be attractive); see
also Chris Carmody et al., Congress Hears Charges of Forfeiture Abuse, NAT'L L.J.,
October 12, 1992, at 5 (stating that "the forfeiture program was viewed as an ideal way
to debilitate drug traffickers' aircraft, vessels, cars, stash houses and cash").
11. See H.R. Rep. 1444, supra note 10, at 4574 (stating that the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act sought to reduce availability of drugs subject to abuse).
12. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the war on drugs is being lost.
See Randall Sambor, 7th Circuit Concludes Drug War Is Lost Cause, NAT'L L.J., June
7, 1993, at 6 (citing an increase in drug cases by 23% in district courts of the 7th Circuit and by 27% in Chicago-based appeals courts last year); see also L. Felipe Restrepo,
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protect the innocent owner of forfeitable property, yet many violations of civil liberties remain unrestrained.' 3 The Supreme Court
has stepped in to protect civil rights from being trampled upon by
this war with its decisions in four drug forfeiture cases this
term.' 4 In one of those cases, Austin v. United States,'" the Supreme Court considered an application of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment for only the second time in history and held that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply to forfeitures of property under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). t6
In applying the Excessive Fines Clause to § 881, the Court
used strong language defining § 881 as a statute imposing pun-

False Logic Misdirects The U.S. War On Drugs, NAT'L L.J., April 12, 1993, at 13 (remarking on the failure of the war on drugs as evidenced by the continuation of streetcorner sales and the stability of the wholesale price of cocaine). But see Needed Course
Correction In Drug War; Supreme Court Blows The Whistle On Outrageous Forfeitures of
Assets, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at 4 (asserting that researchers claim the war on drugs
has led to a decline in the number of casual marijuana and cocaine users and a change
in public attitudes toward drug use).
Examples abound of the government seizing large amounts of property of innocent
or small drug users. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan et al., Where the Innocent Lose, NEwsWEEK, January 4, 1993, at 42 (telling the story of the Bergmans in South Dakota who
lost their lakefront home as a result of U.S. Marshals finding a friend's marijuana and
their daughter's marijuana butt at their home).
13. In 1988 Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), the "innocent owner" defense
to civil forfeiture, which provides: "[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent,
or willful blindness of the owner."
14. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 562 (1993) (holding
that simply moving the res outside the district court's control by transfernng the funds to
the Treasury does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear a claimant's appeal
on a forfeiture judgment); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.. 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1134
(1993) (holding that an owner's lack of knowledge that her home was purchased with the
proceeds of a drug transaction fell under the innocent owner defense and that defense was
not limited to a bona fide purchaser or one who acquired the property interest before the
acts giving rise to the forfeiture took place); cf. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2812 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to forfeiture of property);
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993) (holding that the forfeiiure of a
business on the basis of selling seven obscene magazines at some of the stores does not
violate the free-speech provision of the First Amendment but remanding the case for a
determination of whether the seizure violated the Excessive Fines Clause consistent with
Austin).
15. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
16. Id. at 2812; see also Browning-Ferns Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 262
(1989) (stating that the Court was for the first time considering an application of the Excessive Fines Clause). The Court in Browning-Ferrisheld that the Clause did not apply to
constrain money damages in a civil suit. Id. at 264.
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ishment for an offense." Tins case not only empowers state courts
to strike down forfeiture under § 881 as excessive under the Eighth
Amendment but may also have far-reaching double jeopardy restrictions on the government's ability to even bring actions under
§ 881.
This Comment examines § 881, as defined by Austin, under
the Court's analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause and concludes
that § 881 would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause where
a criminal prosecution is also pursued by the government. Part II
discusses the Austin case. Part I analyzes § 881 under the Court's
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and concludes that
§ 881 would be barred by both the successive prosecution and
multiple punishment arms of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part I
also advocates extension of the double jeopardy doctrine, based on
public policy considerations, to bar § 881 where there has been an
acquittal from prosecution under the underlying drug laws.
II.

BACKGROUND: AUSTIN V U.S.

On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin sold two grams of
cocaine to a customer of his auto body shop."8 The next day
Austin's auto body shop and mobile home were legally searched
and marijuana, cocaine, and large amounts of cash were seized by
state law enforcement officers. 9 Austin pleaded guilty to one
count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute under South
Dakota's drug laws and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.2" Less than one month later, the United States government
filed a civil forfeiture action against Austin seeking forfeiture of
his mobile home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7).2
Despite Austin's argument that forfeiture of the properties
violated the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause, the United
States District Court entered summary judgment for the United

17. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
18. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
19. Id. at 815-16. Specifically, a twenty-two caliber revolver, some marijuana, $3,300
cash, a piece of mirror, a small white tube and a razor blade were found in the body
shop. Id. In the mobile home, an electronic scale, a small baggie of cocaine, a bundle of
cocaine, a baggie of marijuana and $660 cash was found. Id. at 816.
20. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2803.
21. Id., see supra note 4 (providing the text of §§ 881 (a)(4) and (7)).
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States.22 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "reluctantly" agreed with the government and affirmed.' The
United States Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Court of
Appeals and remanded.24
The Supreme Court abandoned its traditional focus on whether
a statute is criminal or civil in applying the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture.' Instead, the Court
framed the issue as whether §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are punishment
and thus fall under the confines of the Excessive Fines Clause.26
The Court first recognized that historically one of the main purposes of forfeiture was to punish the property owner.27 Looking specifically at §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), the Court next concluded that
the legislative intent behind this statute was also punishment.2"
The Government argued that §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are remedial
because they remove the instruments of the drug trade and because
they are compensation to the Government for law enforcement and
social problems resulting from the drug trade.29 The Court rejected
these arguments and concluded that forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) constitutes "payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense" and is, therefore, subject to the limitations of the
Excessive Fines Clause.3" The Court deferred to the lower courts
to consider the definition of when a fine is constitutionally "exces31
sive."

22. 508 Depot Street. 964 F.2d at 816. The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 817.
24. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
25. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional civil/cnnunal distinction when applying constitutional protections to civil forfeiture actions);
see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1976) (concluding that, based on the
history of the Eighth Amendment, it was intended to apply to protect those convicted of
comes and therefore did not apply to paddling of children as a means of discipline in
public schools).
26. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
27. Id. at 2810.
28. Id. at 2811.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2812 (quoting Browning-Ferns Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265

(1989)).
31. Id.
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ANALYSIS

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life and limb.1 3' The Double Jeopardy Clause
has traditionally been thought of as encompassing dual armed
protections: the successive prosecution arm and the multiple punM
ishments arm." In Helverng v. Mitchell,'
Justice Brandeis articulated the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause: "[T]he Dou-

ble Jeopardy Clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting
a second time to punish criminally for the same offense., 35 While

the Double Jeopardy Clause was initially interpreted to apply only
in cases where the defendant was literally in jeopardy of losing his
or her life, it has since been interpreted to apply to prosecutions
and pumshments other than those containing a corporal element.36
Still, the clause may generally be applied only where the prosecutions or punishments are cnminal in nature.37
The dual arms of the Double Jeopardy Clause protect against
two different interests of defendants. The bar against successive
prosecution protects the defendant's interest in the finality of the
verdict, a protection often said to be at the heart of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 3 The successive prosecution arm of the clause

32. U.S. CONST. amend. V
33. See George C. Thomas, III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy/Multiple

Punishment Problem, 78 Nw.U. L. REv. 1359, 1361-62 (1984); see also North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (stating that the amendment protects against second
prosecutions and multiple punishments), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
34. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
35. Id. at 399.
36. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873), overruled on other
grounds by Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to punishments for felonies, minor cnmes and misdemeanors thus
extending its literal interpretation); see also Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v.
Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66

N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 112-13 (1991) (describing the extension in interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
37. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROME H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

§

24.1(b)

(1984) (stating that "lilt may generally be said that the [double jeopardy] prohibition has
no application in noncriminal cases"). But see infra text accompanying notes 148-75 (discussing the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil statutes).
38. See MARTIN L. FREEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 198-99 (1969) (emphasizing that
many courts and writers have recognized that the rule against successive prosecution is of
far more significance than the rule against multiple punishment); see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The basis of the Fifth
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protects the defendant from having to defend him or herself against

repeated attempts at conviction which would "subject[] him [or her]
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel[] him [or her] to

live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity .3' The bar
against successive prosecution also denies the prosecution an opportunity to perfect their case against the defendant until they
successfully convict him or her.' On the other hand, the bar
against multiple punishments protects against unfairness in sentencing.4' Multiple punishment issues can arise where there are two
punishments being imposed in a single prosecution or where there
are two punishments being imposed in successive prosecutions.42
A.

Dual Sovereignty

Because there is potential for both state and federal prosecution under their respective drug laws, this Comment must first
address the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy
Clause. This exception allows for an individual to be prosecuted
for the infraction of the laws of both the state and the federal
government for the same cnminal act.43 The dual sovereignty exception is based upon the rationale that each citizen of the United

Amendment protection against double jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by
successive trials
"). This notion is supported by the deference the Court gives to
Congress' intent to impose two punishments in a single proceeding. See infra notes 13941 (discussing the Court's holding in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983)).
39. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
40. See Tibbs v. United States, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42 (1982) (asserting that multiple trials create the risk that the government will win eventually by sheer perseverance and by
the ability to perfect its case).
41. See Jahncke, supra note 36, at 117 (arguing that the multiple punishment prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause is concerned with unfairness in sentencing and not
the mere fact of a second prosecution).
42. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1953) (holding that where cumulative
sentences are imposed in a single trial, double jeopardy prevents the sentencing court
from proscribing a greater punishment than the legislature intended); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that a civil sanction brought following a
criminal conviction can be so divorced from any remedial government goal so as to constitute multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause).
43. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that prosecution by
the state and federal governments for the same act was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause). The dual sovereignty exception has also been extended to allow two states to
prosecute an individual for the same crimnal act. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88
(1985) (holding that the defendant violated the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns and
therefore a guilty plea to hiring men to kidnap his wife in Georgia did not bar prosecution in Alabama where the wife was taken from her home). This Comment focuses only
on actions brought under § 881 which is a federal statute, and therefore dual state prosecutions are not in issue.
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States is also a citizen of a state and that both exercise sovereignty
over him or her. The Court considers prosecution by the federal
government following state court prosecution as necessary to avoid
undermimng federal law enforcement. 44
There are, however, two limitations to the application of the
dual sovereignty exception to federal prosecution.45 The first is a
judicial limitation prohibiting federal and state authorities from
manipulating the system for purposes of obtaining a second prosection.' The second limitation is a Department of Justice policy
wich states that a federal prosecution can follow a state prosecution for the same criminal act only when there are compelling
reasons and the prosecuting attorney obtains permission from the
Assistant Attorney General.47
Neither limitation to the dual sovereignty exception would
likely apply to a case brought under § 881, therefore, if the initial
prosecution were under state law, there would be no double jeopardy bar to the federal government bringing an action under
§ 881. 4" Only if there were blatant collusion between authorities
in an individual case would the Court apply the first limitation.49
Cooperation between state and federal governments would not rise
to this level.5° The second limitation has not been held to be a
44. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
45. See Jim Titus et al.. Project: Twenty-Second Annual Review Of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 1029,
1252 (1993) (listing two limitations on the dual sovereignty doctrine which affect the federal government's authority to prosecute).
46. See id. at 1252 (citing numerous cases where this doctrine was established). The
defendant bears the burden of proving that a state prosecution is really a vicarious federal
prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Hamson, 918 F.2d 469, 475 (5th Cir. 1990) (placing the burden on the defendant to prove the state prosecution is merely a tool of the
federal prosecution and then shifting the burden to the government to show there was no
double jeopardy violation).
47. This policy is called the "Petite Policy" and gets its name from the Supreme Court
case recognizing its existence, Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1960); see
also EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATrORNEYS, CRIMINAL DivIsION, UNITED STATES
AToRNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.142 (1985) (describing the Petite policy).
48. There would also be no bar to the state prosecuting the defendant after the federal
government brought suit under § 881. See Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 139
(1889) (reaffirming the principle that the same act may be considered a criminal offense
by two sovereigns with concurrent jurisdiction and punishment by one does not preclude
punishment by the other).
49. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959) (providing that, where the
FBI turned over evidence against the defendant to the state, the state prosecution was not
"a sham and a cover" for the federal prosecution and was therefore not barred).
50. See id. at 124 (despite cooperation between federal and state prosecutors, state
prosecution after federal acquittal "not a sham and cover for federal prosecution" and
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constitutional limitation but, rather, only an unenforceable policy 5
While the government has chosen to follow such a policy, if a
federal prosecution has been instituted following a state prosecution
for the same act and the policy has not been followed (i.e. there is
no compelling reason and the requisite permssion has not been
granted), the federal suit is not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.52
In practice, either the federal or state governments can initiate
prosecution of controlled substance cases. The United States
Attorneys' Manual provides factors to be considered when deterrming whether the federal government will proceed with prosecution or whether referral should be made to state or local prosecutors.53 After considering these factors, in many cases the federal
government retains jurisdiction over prosecution and may be more
willing to prosecute when the state forfeiture law does not allow
for the broad forfeiture found under § 853 and § 881. As individuals will often be charged under federal drug statutes and then subjected to civil forfeiture, or vice-versa, this Comment's analysis of

therefore not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause).
51. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 2010 (1991) (stating that the Petite policy gives no substantive rights to the
defendant to avoid a subsequent federal sentence following a state conviction). Several
recent court cases held that the Petite policy is only an internal guideline and therefore it
does not give the defendant any substantive rights. See, e.g., United States v. Simpkins,
953 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1988 (1992); United States v.
Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1157 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gourley, 835 F.2d
249, 251 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988).
52. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1120 (stating that the Petite policy conferred no substantive rights on the defendant and the defendant could not invoke the policy to avoid a
consecutive federal sentence following a state conviction); see also United States v. Rodnguez, 948 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2970 (1992) (holding
that only the government may invoke the Petite policy).
53. UNrrED STATEs ATrORNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 47, § 9-101.400. Among the
factors to be considered when entering into any controlled substance prosecutive deterimnation are:
1) the sufficiency of the evidence, 2) the degree of federal involvement, 3) the
effectiveness of state and local prosecutors, 4) the willingness of state or local
authorities to prosecute cases investigated primarily by federal agents, 5) the
amount of controlled substances, 6) the violator's background, 7) the possibility
that prosecution will lead to disclosure of evidence of controlled substance violations committed by other persons, and 8) the district court's backlog of cases.
Id. Note that under the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy, the state and federal government could both prosecute under their respective drug laws but, based on the
policy of the federal government, this will not happen often. See supra notes 47-52 and
accompanying text (describing the government's policy when prosecuting cases already
initiated by a state).
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double jeopardy implications of § 881 is pertinent.'
B. Successive Prosecution
Application of the successive prosecution arm has traditionally
focused on whether the second prosecution is one which punishes
"criminally" for the same offense.5 In Mitchell, the Court defined
the test of whether a statute was criminal or civil as one of statutory construction and, in doing so, gave complete deference to the
"civil" or "criminal" label affixed by Congress. 6 Mitchell was
acquitted at trial of willful evasion of taxes and then brought into
court by the federal government to collect the deficiency in taxes
plus an additional penalty equal to fifty percent of the deficiency " The Court held that because Congress labeled the second
action against Mitchell as "civil", the second prosecution was not
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court limited the
54. This Comment does not apply to the numerous cases where prosecution under the
drug laws is not sought, because there is no double jeopardy issue in those cases. See I
DAViD B. SMrrH, PROSEcUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 1.02 at 1-7 (1992
& Supp. 1993) (stating that civil forfeiture actions are frequently brought against co-conspirators against whom there was not enough evidence to charge for violation of the drug
laws); see also Crime and Punishment Balance Needed on Seizures of Ill-Gotten Gains,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 8, 1993, at B10, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File (describing a recent study which found that 80% of the people whose property was forfeited to the government were never charged with a drug crime).
There are numerous violations of the Title 21 drug laws upon which seizure under
§ 881 can be based. These include: § 841, § 842 (cases of repeat violations of certain
more serious regulatory offenses), § 843 (violations concerning fraud and involving counterfeit substances), § 844(a) (second offense of possession), § 845 (special penalties for
distribution to people under age 21), §§ 846, 848, 854, 952 (importation of controlled
substances), § 953 (exportation of controlled substances), § 955 (possession of Schedule I
or II or narcotic drugs on board vessels arriving in or departing the U.S.), § 955(a) (manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute controlled
substances on board vessels), § 955(c) (attempt or conspiracy to commit a violation of
§ 955(a)), § 957 (export and import by certain nonregistrants), § 959 (manufacture or distribution for purposes of unlawful importation), § 963 (attempt or conspiracy to commit
felony importation offenses of title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act). S. REP. NO. 225, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For purposes of this Comment, violation of any of these statutes will be referred to as violation of the federal drug
laws.
55. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 443 (1989) (suggesting that a "cnminat" statute only could be barred under the successive prosecution arm because Brandeis
used the word "criminally" when describing the double jeopardy bar to successive prosecutions whereas a civil statute may be barred under the multiple punishment prohibition
based on the omission of "criminally" in that description).
56. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
57. Id. at 396.
58. l at 406. Mitchell also argued that the fifty percent penalty was res judicata as a
result of his cnrimnal trial. Id. at 397. The Court disrmssed application of res judicata
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broad holding of Mitchell in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.9 In
Mendoza-Martinez, the Court first inquired whether Congress intended to enact a civil statute.' If the Court determined that Congress did intend to enact a civil statute, the Court next inquired
whether the statute was "penal or regulatory in character" and
examined a list of factors relevant to the inquiry 6 t
In United States v. Ward,62 the Court restated Mendoza-Martinez, stressing the criminal/civil distinction.63 First, the Court
asked whether Congress expressly or impliedly classified the statute
as civil or criminal.' Only where Congress has indicated that the
penalty was intended to be civil would the Court further inquire
"whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate that intention."' The Court, however, limited
its second inquiry into the effect of the statute by stating that
"only the clearest proof' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress' manifest
preference for a civil sanction.' The Court further provided that
the factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez would be helpful in
determining whether the purpose and effect of a statute is in fact
penal yet these factors are not dispositive.67 Recently, in United
because of the difference in degrees of burdens of proof in a cnrnunal and civil trial. Id.
59. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
60. Id, at 169.
61. Id. at 168. These factors are as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
62. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
63. Id. at 248-49. But see Michael Schecter, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture
Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1158 (1990) (arguing that Ward did not directly apply
the Mendoza-Martinez test, but, instead reformulated the Mitchell test). The language of
the Mendoza-Martinez test is almost identical to that of Ward but for the word "cnminar' While the Court in Ward stated that the Mendoza-Martnez factors are "helpful" and
"neither exhaustive nor dispositive," Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, in Mendoza-Martinez the
Court only claimed that the factors were all "relevant to the inquiry" regarding the penal
nature of the statute and "may often point in differing directions." Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 169.
64. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
65. Id. at 248-49.
66. Id. at 249 (quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
67. Id. (stating that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispos-
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6 the Court applied
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
Ward and Mendoza-Martinez and held that a statute providing for
forfeiture of firearms did not rise to the level of a criminal penalty
when the conviction followed an acquittal on criminal charges
involving firearms.6 9
Once the Court finds that the second statute is, in fact, criminal, the Court will determine whether the second statute is barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Blockburger v. United States,0
the Supreme Court applied a "same elements" test to determine
whether there is a single offense, which would be barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.7' The "same elements" test inquires
whether each statute requires proof of a fact which the other does
not; if not, they are the same offense and barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.7" In Blockburger, violations of two sections of
the Narcotics Act based on only one sale of morphine were held to
be separate offenses and prosecution under both sections therefore
was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.73

1. Section 881 is Criminal
Arguably, the Supreme Court does not require a statute to be
found criminal to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Breed v.
Jones,74 the Court looked beyond the civil label of a juvenile statute and found that double jeopardy may attach in juvenile delinquency proceedings.75 The Court in Breed stated that "the risk to
which the term jeopardy refers is that traditionally associated with
'actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate
public justice." ' Although the Court in Breed based its decision
on the statute's deprivation of individual liberty, ownership of

itive.") In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court maintained that these factors are not dispositive
and may point in differing directions. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. See supra note
61 (listing the factors set out by the Court in Mendoza-Martinez).
68. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
69. Id. at 366.
70. 284 U.S. 299 (1932), overruled on other grounds by Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684 (1980).
71. Id. at 304.
72. Id.

73. Id. Section 1 of the Narcotics Act forbids sale except m or from the original
stamped package and section 2 forbids sale not in pursuance of a written order of the
person to whom the drug was sold. Id. at 301.
74. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
75. Id. at 529.
76. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)).
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property arguably represents freedom and thus the government's
seizure of it would also be a deprivation of individual liberty
In addition, the Court has recently loosened its longstanding
policy of giving deference to the label of "civil" or "criminal"
affixed by Congress and has instead examined the true nature of
the statute.77 In Austin, the Court declined to make a distinction
between civil and criminal proceedings in analyzing the Excessive
Fines Clause78 despite a history of adhering to this distinction
when applying other constitutional protections to civil forfeiture
proceedings.79 In United States v. Halper,° the Court refused to
find the civil labeling of a statute dispositive in its double jeopardy
analysis.8" The Court has also applied some of the protections
afforded to criminal defendants to individuals in civil actions thus
blurring the line between a civil and criminal action. The Supreme
Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-

incrimination," the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,83 and the Due Process Clause's
guarantee of speedy trial" apply to civil forfeiture actions. The
Court would probably not abandon a crimnal/civil distinction altogether given its historical use but the Court may, in the future, be
less willing to accept a statute at face value.
Despite the expansion of the Mitchell pure statutory construction test, the Court has recently applied Mitchell in lieu of
Mendoza-Martinez or Ward thus keeping the Mitchell test alive."
77. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (stating that punishment "cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law").
78. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
79. Id. at 2801 n.4. The Court employed this distinction in holding that the Fourth
Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures applied to civil forfeiture, One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965), and in holding that the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause did not. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475,
480-82 (1896). The Court also distinguished between criminal and civil proceedings in
holding that the due process requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable double need not be
proven in civil forfeiture proceedings. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237
(1878).
80. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
81. Id. at 442.
82. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886), overruled on other grounds by
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463 (1976), Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
83. 116 U.S. at 634.
84. See United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983)
(applying Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to an 18-month delay in filing a civil
forfeiture action).
85. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-43 (describing the test in successive prosecution cases
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Under the Mitchell line of cases, § 881 would probably be considered civil. On its face, § 881 was arguably not intended by
Congress to serve as punishment. Congress' use of the Admiralty
and Maritime Claims as process for seizure under § 8816 and
Congress' placement of § 881 in the administrative penalties and
not the criminal penalties section support the claim that § 881 was
intended as a civil statute. 7 In Mitchell, the Court defines forfeiture of goods or their value as sanctions "which have been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the original revenue
law of 1789 " Like the statutes at issue in Mitchell,9 Congress
intended to impose both crinmal and civil remedies for violation
of the drug laws through the enactment of § 853 and § 881.0 In
addition, once § 881 has been labeled as civil, it will not lose the
quality of a civil action because more than the amount of damages
is recovered.9'
However, despite Congress' intent to classify § 881 as civil,
§ 881 is distinguishable from the statutes at issue in the Mitchell
line of cases and therefore the "statutory construction" test should
not be applied. Unlike § 881, the statutes determined to be civil in
Mitchell, United States v. Hess92 and Rex Trailer v. United
States93 all provided for reimbursement and damages for abuse of
the government's property rights. In Rex Trailer, the government
was protecting its right to make contracts, and hold and dispose of
property by imposition of liquidated damages to reimburse the
fraudulent securing of U.S. property ' Indeed, the Court has held
as a statutory construction test). In distinguishing Mitchell from the multiple punishment
issue in Halper, the Court restated the successive prosecution bar without regard to the
broadening of the Mitchell test in Ward. Id.
86. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
87. See Schecter, supra note 63, at 1155 (arguing that because Congress placed forfeiture in the adinumstrative penalties title and not the civil penalties title, one can infer
that Congress intended it to be a civil statute).
88. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938).
89. Id. at 404-05 (finding that the sanction in the "Penalties" section of the statute was
criminal and the sanction under the "Additions to the Tax" section of the statute was civil).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., (1984), reprnted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392-93 (encouraging the use of both civil and cnminal forfeiture

with the enactment of § 853).
91. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943) (stating that
"[a] remedy does not lose the quality of a civil action because more than the precise
amount of so-called actual damage is recovered.").
92. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
93. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
94. Id. at 151. The statute at issue in Rex Trailer provided for damages to be paid to

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:235

that the government may resort to the same remedies as a private
person to protect its property rights.95 In Mitchell and Hess, Congress provided damages to be paid to the government for fraudulent representation of taxable income and collusive bidding on
government contracts, respectively 96 In all three instances, the
government sustained a loss for which reimbursement and damages
would clearly be appropriate had the government been an individual.' The real and personal property forfeitable under § 881, however, are not property of the government and therefore § 881 does

not serve to protect the government's rights in its capacity to act
as a private person. Furthermore, § 881 does not provide for reimbursement for the government's efforts in obtaining property due it
nor does the money collected necessarily even cover the cost of
the forfeiture."
Section 881 would more likely be found criminal under the
broadened test set out in Ward99 and applied by the Court in One
Assortment of Firearms."t An application of the first part of the
test, whether Congress expressly or impliedly indicated a preference

for a civil or criminal label,'' nurrors the statutory construction
test discussed above and would probably result in a finding that
§ 881 is civil in nature. However, the purpose and effect of § 881
can clearly be proven to be so punitive as to negate Congress'
intention.1t 2

the United States for the fraudulent obtaining of a benefit under the Surplus Property Act
of 1944. Id. at 148-49.
95. See Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 229, 231 (1850) (stating that, as
an owner of property, the U.S. has the same right to have that property protected by
local laws as other persons).
96. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938); Hess, 317 U.S. at 551-52.
97. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 550-51 (stating that the law can provide the same measure
of damages for the government as for an individual, including punitives); Rex Trailer, 350
U.S. at 151 (maintaining that the government can resort to the same remedies as an individual in the protection of its property rights); Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 (affirming that
damages for fraudulent reporting of taxes provided indemnity for the governments loss).
98. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET SEIZURES AND FORFEITURES: A JOINT STUDY
TEAM'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEMS at 7-9, 39-40 (1983) (asserting that vehicle forfeitures, which constitute the bulk of civil forfeitures, are not cost-effective and are not
revenue producers); see also SMrrH, supra note 54, at § 1.02, 1-5 n.1 (stating that whether most civil forfeitures produce more revenue than they cost is unknown because there
are no records kept).
99. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
100. United States v. One Assortment of Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63 (1984).
101. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
102. Id. at 248-49.
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Applying Mendoza-Martinez to § 881 reveals that the purpose
and effect of § 881 is, in fact, penal. 3 Section 881 does involve
an affirmative disability or restraint-taking away someone's property without just compensation." ° The second factor in MendozaMartinez looks at whether the statute has historically been regarded
as punishment." The First Congress viewed forfeiture as punishment, proven by its placement of forfeiture alongside the other
provisions for punishment."° Similarly, the Court has also recogmized forfeiture to be punishment.0 7 The addition of the innocent
owners defense further shows an intent that § 881 impose punishment on those deserving of it and erodes the notion that the property itself is guilty in a forfeiture action.' Forfeiture of contraband is distinguishable because it is never legally owned and therefore its forfeiture does not deprive the owner of a property interest."0
103. See supra note 61 (listing the factors established by the Court in Mendoza-Martinez to deterrmne when a statute is punishment).
104. See Henry C. Darmstadter & Leslie J. Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical
Considerations of Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHrTrER L. REV. 27, 50
(1987) (proposing that § 881 involves an affirmative disability or restraint since property
is taken away without compensation).
105. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
106. The First Congress stated that any person violating the customs laws was required
to:
Forfeit and pay the sum of four hundred dollars for every offence
be
disabled from holding any office of trust or profit under the United States, for
a term not exceeding seven years
And all goods, wares, and merchandise
[violating the customs laws] shall become forfeited, and may be seized by any
officer of the customs; and where the value thereof shall amount to four hundred dollars, the vessel, tackle, apparel and furniture, shall be subject to like
forfeiture and seizure.
Act of July 31, 1789, §12, 1 Stat. 39 (1789).
107. See Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 363-64 (1808) (recognizing forfeiture
as punishment and noting that forfeiture requires some measure of fault by the property
owner); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87
(1974) (finding that the forfeiture of conveyances further the same purpose as the underlying criminal statutes-punishment and deterrence).
108. By excepting innocent owners from forfeiture, the statute reveals a true intent of
punishing the person. The in rem fiction of punishing the property no longer can provide
a basis for the forfeiture action.
109. See J. Morrs Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework
for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 478 (1976) (defining contraband as
malum in se property which conceptually cannot deprive the owner of a legal property
interest); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951), overruled on other grounds by
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (finding that illegally seized contraband was property for purposes of the exclusionary rule but that the defendant was not entitled to have
it returned to him); cf One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699
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The third factor inquires whether the statute has a mental state
requirement or "scienter...... Although § 881 does not explicitly
require proof of mens .rea, the statute implicitly requires proof that
the owner of the property was not innocent."' Furthermore, in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,"' the Court established an innocent owner defense where the owner was "uninvolved in and unaware of' the wrongful activity and where the
owner "had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent
the proscribed use of his property "11 Section 881 promotes the
traditional aims of pumshment-retribution and deterrence, the
fourth factor of Mendoza-Martinez."4 The purpose of civil forfeiture is to deter and punish criminal activity "' The behavior to

which § 881 applies is already criminal, meeting the fifth factor of
Mendoza-Martinez, as the underlying behavior of violating the drug
laws can be prosecuted as a crime." 6
Section 881 probably does serve an alternative purpose aside
from punishment and therefore the sixth factor would not lead to a
finding that the statute is criminal. Forfeiture of contraband serves
the remedial purpose of removing dangerous or illegal items from
society ".. Forfeiture of property under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)

(1975) (affirming that the application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture was not underrmned by the Court's pnor statement that seized contraband per se was not returnable
because returning contraband per se would have frustrated the express policy against possession of such objects).
110. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
111. If the owner can prove that he or she is innocent, then the owner will fall under
the innocent owner defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988) (defining innocence for
purposes of forfeiture of conveyances as without knowledge, consent or willful blindness
of the owner); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (defimng innocent for purposes of
forfeiture of real property as without knowledge or consent of the owner); see also
Schecter, supra note 63, at 1161 (proposing that based on the innocent owners defense in
Calero-Toledo, forfeiture is based on an inability of an owner to prove innocent mens
rea). For a discussion of the Calero-Toledo defense, see infra note 113 and accompanying
text.
112. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
113. Id. at 689. This defense was created before the statutory innocent owner defense
was enacted. It is not as effective a defense as the statutory innocent owner defense because of the burden on the owner of proving that he or she took preventative measures.
114. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
115. See TROLAND, supra note 5, at 30, 55 (emphasizing to Assistant U.S. Attorneys
that the purpose of civil forfeiture is to "deter and punish criminal activity," not to make
profit for the government).
116. See Schecter, supra note 63, at 1162 (stating that the fifth factor of Mendoza-Martnez is met because drug possession, the underlying behavior, is a crime).
117. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984).
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serves the remedial purpose of eliminating the existence of drugs
and drug dealers in this country "' On the other hand, the Court
stated in Austin that forfeiture of property is "a penalty that ha[s]
absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to
the cost of enforcing the law ""' In addition, forfeiture does not
further the remedial goals articulated in the legislative history of

§ 881."2 While forfeiture under § 881 may help fund law enforcement, it is not considered a civil remedy because the costs are

not being associated with the harm from that particular case.'
Whether or not § 881 serves some remedial purpose, nearly every
criminal statute has an alternative non-penal purpose and thus this

factor alone is not determinative."
The last factor of Mendoza-Martinez asks whether § 881 is
well tailored to the nonremedial goal of eliminating drugs from

society Whether § 881 is narrowly tailored to furthering this goal
can be analyzed on both a societal and an individual level." z
Societally, the war on drugs is a high priority of the government
and any marginal gain in furtherance of that goal would be well118. See Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 104, at 50 (recognizing that seizure serves
to impede drug traffic and therefore bestows a benefit upon society, even though this is
incidental and may be viewed more generally as deterrence).
119. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (quoting United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)). But see United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (listing as
some of the remedial purposes of § 881: "impeding the success of the criminal enterprise
by eliminating its resources and instrumentalities, diminishing the efficiency and profitability of the business by increasing the costs and risks associated with it, and helping to
finance the government's efforts to combat [dirug trafficking").
120. See H.R. Rep. 1444, supra note 10, at 4566 (asserting that the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, of which civil forfeiture is a part, was
enacted with the goals of increasing research, penalizing drug dealers, and encouraging
users to seek treatment). The remedial goals of increasing research and encouraging users
to seek treatment are not furthered by civil forfeiture and thus civil forfeiture was intended as a penalty. See Schecter, supra note 63, at 1155 (arguing that because there is no
direct connection between seizure or property and the remedial goals within the legislative
history, forfeiture is only a penalty).
121. See James B. Speta, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881,
Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MicH. L. REv. 165, 190 (1990)
(stating that "[a] civil remedy exists only when the costs of the single act can be associated with a specific harm"); see also 4 FOWLER V HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 25.1 (2d ed. 1986) (defining compensation as damages offsetting injury).
122. See Clark, supra note 109, at 436 (arguing that few laws serve only the purpose
of retribution or deterrence-even the death penalty serves to prevent crime by getting
criminals off the street).
123. See Schecter, supra note 63, at 1162-63 (arguing that, while forfeiture may be narrowly tailored when viewed societally, it is not narrowly tailored when viewed individually under the zero tolerance policy).
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tailored." One could argue, however, that the inefficacy of civil
forfeiture in eliminating drugs from society reveals that the true
purpose of the statute is deterrence." Forfeiture of property under § 881 is overly broad in relation to the remedial goal of seizing contraband. On an individual level, forfeiture is not well tailored to its goal because of the disproportionality between the drug
violation and the amount seized. 26 The Court in Austin found
that in any individual case, forfeiture under § 881 may not be
narrowly tailored to any remedial goal of the government and may
thus violate the Excessive Fines Clause. 27
2.

Analysis Under Blockburger

After § 881 has been found by the Court to be crimnal,
§ 881 would fail the "same elements" test articulated by the Court
in Blockburger and a second prosecution would thus be barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Arguably, because proof of the involvement of property is not an element of the violation of the
drug laws, § 881 requires proof of an additional fact and thus the
Blockburger test would be satisfied, notwithstanding any overlaps
in proof. 29 Moreover, forfeiture under § 881 only requires the
government to show probable cause that the drug laws have been
violated and then the burden shifts to the claimant to prove his or
her innocence. 3 ° In many cases, the individual is not even prosecuted under the drug laws so that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt
3
that a drug law was violated is not required by § 881.1 1

124. See id. at 1162 (arguing that as fighting the war on drugs is a national priority,
any furtherance of that important goal would be narrowly tailored).
125. See Clark, supra note 109, at 480 (arguing that depriving an owner of his or her
yacht based on a drug violation or even depriving an owner of ever owning or leasing
any vehicle would be ineffective in preventing drug use and thus reveals the true purpose
of civil forfeiture-deterrence).
126. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionality between
the drug violations and amount of property seized under the "zero tolerance" policy).
127. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1983).
128. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Blockburger
"same elements" test. Note that the order of the trials is unimportant for purposes of
Blockburger analysis. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
129. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975), overruled on other
grounds by Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) ("If each requires proof of a fact that
the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap
in the proof offered to establish the crimes.").
130. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 54 (noting that in many cases the individuals against whom civil
forfeiture is sought are never criminally charged).
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However, a drug law violation required by § 881 can be likened to a "lesser included offense" within § 881 and would con32
stitute the same offense under Blockburger In Brown v. Ohio,
the Court held that "the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included
offense."'' 3 In Brown, joyriding was found to be a lesser included
offense of auto theft and thus the same statutory offense under
Blockburger because it required no proof beyond which was required for conviction of auto theft."3 Similarly, a violation of the
drug laws does not require proof of elements beyond those required for a violation of § 881. Just as the prosecutor who had
established joyriding needed only to prove mens rea to establish
auto theft in Brown,'35 the prosecutor who established a violation
of the drug laws through a conviction need only establish the property was used or intended to be used in the violation of the drug
laws for forfeiture under § 881. Just as the prosecutor in Brown
who had established auto theft necessarily established the lesser
included offense of joyriding,'36 the prosecdtor who establishes
probable cause of a violation of § 881 necessarily37 shows probable
cause of a violation of the underlying drug laws.'
Unlike in Brown where both offenses required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for conviction, 3 1 § 881 merely requires probable
cause that the property was used illegally in violating the drug
laws and the underlying conviction under the drug laws requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'39 However, this may not preclude likening a drug law violation to a "lesser included offense"
under § 881. Probable cause that a drug violation occurred is inherently proven m any criminal prosecution under the drug laws. If
the person is convicted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
violation occurred encompasses probable cause that it occurred.

132. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).

133. Id. at 169.
134. Id. at 168.
135. Id. at 167.
136. Id. at 168.
137. By definition, forfeiture of property under each subsection of § 881 requires a
violation of the drug laws. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988).
138. Brown was indicted for joyriding and for auto theft, both of which are crimes,
Brown, 432 U.S. at 162-63, conviction for which required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 367 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that due process requires that a criminal defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
139. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining that property can be seized
pursuant to § 881 based only a showing of probable cause).
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Even if the person is not convicted, the state must have shown
probable cause in order to obtain the search warrant which led to
the discovery of evidence to proceed with prosecution under the
drug laws. 4 ° If this argument prevails, then, whether the prosecution for the drug law violation goes before or after the forfeiture
action under § 881, bringing both actions would be barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. Multiple Punishment
In Missouri v. Hunter,141 the Court held that, where a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, there is no double jeopardy bar to imposing cumulative punishment under those statutes in a single trial. 42 The Court further
stated that the Blockburger test is not controlling where there is a
clear indication of contrary legislative intent. 43
1. Section 881 Is Not Barred by Hunter
Before proceeding with an analysis under Hunter, the Court
must first assess whether both statutes involved are criminal in nature.'" Assuming that § 881 is found to be criminal, a straight
application of Hunter reveals that the legislature clearly authorized
the cumulative punishment of drug offenders under § 881. As in
Hunter, where the penalty for armed criminal action was intended
by the legislature to be in addition to the penalty for the underlying charge, 41 civil forfeiture was intended by the legislature to be
an another weapon against the war6 on drugs in addition to criminal
4
prosecution under the drug laws.

140. The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
U.S. CONST.
amend. IV
141. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
142. Id. at 368-69. In Hunter, the defendant was convicted of armed criminal action and
first-degree robbery in a single.trial and was sentenced to ten years in prison for the robbery and fifteen years for armed criminal action, to be served concurrently. Id. at 361-62.
The defendant claimed that the two sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at
362.
143. Id. at 368-69.
144. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (stating that the generally Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal proceedings).
145. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
146. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 was later
amended to add criminal forfeiture as another method of fighting the war on drugs to be
used in conjunction with civil forfeiture. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see
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Hunter can be distinguished, however, from an action under
§ 881. In Hunter, both punishments were brought in one proceeding and, therefore, the only double jeopardy interest of the defendant was in not receiving multiple punishment.147 The interests in
finality were therefore not present in Hunter but would be present
where an action is brought under § 881.14 This argument is

strengthened by the uncertainty inherent in the area of forfeiture
where an individual faces possible prosecution for violation of the
drug laws, criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture.'49
D. Application of United States v Halper to § 881
5 the Court
In United States v. Halper,"'
held that even where
a penalty is labeled "civil," the penalty in a particular case "may
be so extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages
and expenses as to constitute punishment" and thus can be barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.' The Court defined a civil statute as punishment where it "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes."' 52 In Halper, the government prosecuted Halper for sixty-five counts of filing fraudulent
Medicare claims in violation of the False Claims Amendments Act
of 1986.' Halper was found guilty and received a two-year prison sentence and a $5,000 fine and, subsequently, the government
brought suit under the civil False Claims Act subjecting Halper to

also United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986), (declaring that, by failing
to repeal or restrict § 881 when it enacted § 853, Congress revealed an intent to allow
use of § 881 where a criminal proceeding is unsuccessful), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931
(1987); United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F Supp 385 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that
criminal forfeiture proceedings are not barred by civil forfeiture proceedings previously
initiated by the government and that the concurrent proceedings do not violate the Due
Process Clause).
147. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1983).
148. Unlike in Hunter where the cumulative pumshments were imposed in the same
proceeding, an action brought under § 881 must be brought in a separate proceeding from
the criminal prosecution. Id. at 366.
149. See DRUG AGENTs' GUIDE TO FORFEnTURE OF AssETs, supra note 6, at 292-93
(illustrating the use of federal statutes in conjunction with one another as circles within
one another including the underlying drug violation, conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, criminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture and additional legal action against the violator's
assets outside the authority of the Controlled Substances Act).
150. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
151. Id. at 442. This test resembles the civil versus criminal distinction raised by the
Court in prior cases. See supra note 56-69 and accompanying text.
152. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
153. Id. at 437.
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a fine of $130,000."54 The Court found that Halper's liability for
$130,000 was vastly disproportionate compared to the government's
actual damages and therefore the civil suit violated the multiple
punishment arm of the Double Jeopardy Clause.'55
According to the Court's broad test in Halper and the Court's
definition of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) as punishment in Austin,
actions brought under § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) following a criminal
conviction would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
broad holding in Halper requires only a showing that forfeiture
cannot be said to solely serve a remedial purpose.'56 This language would arguably bar any civil forfeiture statute as the purpose
of civil forfeiture is deterrenceand not solely restitution.'57 In
Austin, the Court explicitly defined §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) as
punishment: "'[F]orfeiture of property
[is] a penalty that ha[s]
absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to
the cost of enforcing the law """ While the Austin Court assumed that there may be some remedial aspects of §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7), the Court concluded that §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) cannot
fairly be said to solely serve a remedial purpose and therefore is
pumshment subject to the confines of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.'59 Although the Austin Court did not address the issue of double jeopardy, the Court defined §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) as pumshment under the Halper test and therefore,
§§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) should be barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause following a criminal prosecution.
Although Halper involved the government bringing a civil

154. Id.
155. Id. at 452. Halper's false claims only amounted to a total of $585 loss to the
government. Id. at 437. The District Court approximated the government's costs at
$16,000, including the amount spent investigating and prosecuting Halper's false claims,
and entered summary judgment for the government in that amount. Id. at 439. The Supreme Court remanded to permit the government to demonstrate that the District Court's
assessment of its injuries was incorrect. Id. at 452.
156. Id. at 447.
157. See SMrrH, supra note 54, § 12.10, at 12-126-27 (emphasizing the broad holding
in Halper wourd bar all forfeiture statutes). In Halper, the Court tried to limit its holding
by stating that it was announcing "a rule for the rare case," Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, and
that it did not consider its ruling "far reaching or disruptive of the Government's need to
combat fraud." Id. at 450. But the Court's own statement of its holding emphasizes just
how broad the ruling is, as civil forfeiture is not "rationally related to the goal of making
the government whole." Id. at 451.
158. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (quoting United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
159. Id.
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action following a criminal conviction," ° the underlying principles
of Halper would arguably also apply a double jeopardy bar to
prosecution where the civil action was brought first."' The Court
in Halper did not suggest that its holding was limited to cases
where the criminal prosecution is instituted prior to the imposition
of the civil penalty "62 Moreover, the "'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple
punishments" are at stake regardless of whether the criminal prosecution precedes or succeeds the civil action. 6 In both scenarios,
if the first action is successful there are multiple punishments inflicted upon the individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. There may still be an argument that the federal
government's ability to enforce the law is of paramount importance
and would therefore favor the ability of the federal government to
prosecute criminally following a civil forfeiture action."6 The
government's ability to enforce the law, however, would not
override an individual's constitutional protection.
Halper may still place limits on the application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to § 881. Halper did not foreclose the possibility
of the government receiving any of the civil penalty in that case.
The Court stated that the government was entitled to compensation
for its costs and damages and that this could be accomplished by
the trial court's approximation of cost to the government, based on
the government's accounting.'65 In Halper, the Court remanded
the case to give the government an opportunity to have input in
the determination of its costs.'" Following the Halper model,
each time the government brings suit under § 881, the individual
would object on double jeopardy grounds and an accounting of the

160. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
161. If a civil action is brought first, it must be concluded before the enminal prosecution is initiated for there to be a multiple punishments issue. This is because there must
be an initial punishment from the civil forfeiture decision to bar a second punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
162. SMITH, supra note 54, § 12-10, at 12-128 n.l1.3 (asserting that "nothing in Halper
suggested that its holding was restricted to instances in which criminal proceedings are
instituted prior to assessment of the civil sanction").
163. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (quoting United States v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurrng)).
164. See United States v. Abbate, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1989) (arguing that if state
prosecutions barred federal prosecutions for the same acts, federal law enforcement would
necessarily be hindered).
165. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50.
166. Id. at 452.
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government's costs would follow The individual could then appeal
the decision. In addition, lower courts have been unwilling to find
that a penalty is punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in individual cases. 67 Where there is no direct injury to
the government, courts have found that the government suffered
indirect injury from the wrongdoer's actions large enough to justify
the forfeiture. 6 '
These limitations could be overcome by the Court applying
Halper to bar civil forfeiture under § 881 where there is an initial

criminal conviction or bar the criminal conviction where an action
has been concluded under § 881. Arguably the small amount of
remedial damages the government could collect in a forfeiture case
under § 881 would not justify the great expenditure to the government of trying the large number of forfeiture cases and would promote backlog in federal courts. 69 As Halper has been ineffective
in barring successive prosecution imposing multiple punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court should step in to
establish the double jeopardy implications to an action brought
under § 881.70

167. See Nelson T. Abbott, Note, United States v. Halper. Making Double Jeopardy
Available in Civil Actions, 6 B.Y.U. J. of PUB. L. 551, 568 (1992) (stating that the lower
court decisions after Halper illustrate the reluctance of the courts to find that a penalty is
so severe it is punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy bar).
168. See SMrrH, supra note 54, § 12.10, at 12-129-30 (commenting that the courts have
gotten around Halper by finding that even large amounts of forfeiture were justified by
indirect injury to the government); see also United States v. 40 Moon Hill Road, 884
F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that a recovery in excess of the property value devoted to growing an illegal substance was justified by the large cost that drugs inflict on
society as a whole in the form of drug-related cnme, drug abuse treatment, investigation
and enforcement); Ex parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
the forfeiture was rationally related to the government's injury and expenses involved in
the large drug distribution involved).
169. See David J. Stone, The Opportunity of Austin v. United States: Toward a Functional Approach to Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 427, 445
(1993) (stating that even though the government suffers damage from drug law violations,
"its inability to allege them with any accuracy may preclude the recovery of anything but
a nominal penalty").
170. See id. at 571 (stating that, in fact, no court had yet overturned a civil penalty on
Double Jeopardy grounds at the time the Note was written). Two courts have discussed
the application of Halper to a civil penalty. Id. In the one case the parties settled before
the issue could be examined. See United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990). The other case was dismissed on the grounds that the
civil suit violated a plea bargain agreement. See United States v. Hall, 730 F Supp. 646,
655 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (commenting, in dicta, that if the court had not already dismissed
the case, it would have required the government to submit an approximation of its losses
before deciding if the suit was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause).
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Based on the Court's dicta in Halper and strong policy considerations, Halper should be extended to bar a suit under § 881
following an unsuccessful prosecution under the drug laws. Halper
involved a defendant who was convicted and punished in one trial
and then retried and repunished under a civil act."' Where a defendant is first acquitted and then the federal government institutes
an action under § 881, there is no multiple punishment issue. In
Halper, however, the Court cited the successive nature of the proceedings as critical to its analysis and, therefore, implicitly relied
on the prohibition against successive prosecution in holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause applied."' If multiple punishment was
the sole double jeopardy prohibition in issue, the Court would have
had to follow the deferential holding in Hunter, or, alternatively,
the Court could have overruled Hunter'73 The Court chose to
differentiate Hunter on the basis that in Hunter the multiple punishments were imposed in one proceeding. 74
Furthermore, public policy notions of fairness dictate that
Halper be extended to bar a suit brought under § 881 where the
defendant is acquitted of violating the drug laws. The Court has
stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause "forbids a second trial for
the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to
supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding."'75 The Court's decision in Halper rests upon the premise
that when the Government already has imposed a criminal penalty
in a criminal proceeding and seeks to impose a second penalty in a
civil proceeding, "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the
possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment
because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first
proceeding."' If a defendant was acquitted in the prosecution for
violation of the drug laws, the government would be given another

171. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (explaining Halper's punishments).
172. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.10 (1989) (stating "[tihat the
Government seeks the civil penalty in a second proceeding is critical in triggering the
protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause"); see also Jahncke, supra note 36, at 135
(asserting that despite the Court's focus in Halper on multiple punishment, the Court
treated the case as if Halper also had an interest in finality).
173. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court's holding
in Hunter).
174. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (stating that "[i]n a single proceeding the multiplepunishment issue would be limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed
that authorized by the legislature").
175. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
176. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10 (emphasis added).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:235

opportunity to supply evidence it initially failed to muster and
would have an even better chance of succeeding in a civil forfeiture suit based on the lower standard of proof required.'77 The
government would also be applying § 881 because it is dissatisfied
with the result in the initial prosecution. In fact, it is more likely
that § 881 will be brought only where the defendant has been
acquitted because, if a conviction has been obtained, criminal forfeiture will most likely be sought. 7 ' Allowing the government to
simply try again when the defendant was acquitted would undermine society's faith in the criminal justice system and preclude
finality. Halper should be extended, based on notions of fairness,
to bar the application of § 881 to a defendant acquitted of violating a federal drug law
IV

CONCLUSION

The amount of drug use and abuse in this country is staggering and elimination of drugs from society is certainly an important
goal. The war on drugs, however, is not succeeding. Too much
time and money are spent on penalizing and deterring drug law
violators instead of focusing on education and rehabilitation. Civil
forfeiture is a powerful tool being used to punish violators of the
federal drug laws in addition to federal prosecution and criminal
forfeiture. In the heat of the battle, the government has employed
civil forfeiture and transcended every citizen's right to not be twice
put in jeopardy of life and limb.
Supreme Court recognition that § 881 is barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause where federal prosecution has been undertaken,
regardless of the outcome, would not hinder the main goal of
forfeiture-getting drugs off the streets. Seizure of the actual drugs
and drug paraphernalia is not punishment of the individual and
thus would not be barred by § 881. In fact, "the seizure of large
quantities of illicit drugs has a more significant impact on the drug
trafficker's cost of doing business than asset forfeitures" because
the cost of the drugs seized is much greater than the cost of any
property seized.'79 In addition, the government will still have full

177. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing that the government need only
establish probable cause that the property was involved in the violation of the drug laws).
178. See supra note 149 (describing how the civil and cnminal forfeiture actions are
used in conjunction with one another).
179. Smith, supra note 54, § 1.02, at 1-25.
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use of criminal forfeiture provisions where there is a conviction.
A Double Jeopardy bar to § 881 would serve only to protect
those individuals whom the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed
to protect-individuals who have already been convicted of drugs
and punished. More importantly, an extension of Halper would
protect individuals who have been acquitted of a drug law violation
from undergoing another form of criminal prosection. The Double
Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent the State from using its
resources and power to repeatedly try an individual for an offense
and therefore should provide a bar to § 881 where criminal prosection has already been sought.
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